Moral Hazards and Individual Responsibilities

ゲーリー　ベッカーの記事の抜粋↓
The Erosion of Individual Responsibility-BECKER
Hardly a day goes by during this housing crisis that the media does not report on families in foreclosure proceedings, or in arrears in repayment on mortgages that had close to zero down payment requirements and low “teaser “ interest rates.
This type of response to failed decisions is not unique to the present housing crisis, but is part of a strong trend toward shifting responsibility to others.
Successful attempts to shift the responsibility for bad decisions toward others and to society more generally create a "moral hazard" in behavior.

An important foundation of the philosophy behind the arguments for private enterprise, free economies, and free societies more generally, is that these societies rely on and require individual decision-making and responsibility.

What if anything should governments do to help out in this present financial crisis, mindful of the many kinds of moral hazard that are lurking, but also mindful that the financial structure is delicately balanced? Despite the moral hazard risks, interventionist policies might be justified not because some borrowers or lenders were taken advantage of, but if these interventions would help the economy recover more quickly, and insure that the recession is neither prolonged nor deep. Still it is difficult to see the merits in the Fed's efforts to help the sale of Bears Stearns to JPMorgan Chase by guaranteeing many billions of mortgage and other assets of the company.

ベッカーの考えは、サブプライム問題への政府の介入は、moral hazardsを生むだけだという批判だろう。これは、先のランズバーグの見解とも呼応する。要するに、この問題はFRBや政府がどうこうやって解決できることではないのだ。金利を下げるのもBears Stearnsの処理もモラルハザードだと見ているわけだ。
そして、このモラルハザードが超大規模に起きたのが、まさに日本の教訓の一つである。
つまり、自らの責任で起こした損害を他人（一般国民）に転嫁することが、日本では官主導で大規模に進められた。これは自由社会の原則を踏みにじる社会主義的統制政策だ。
アメリカはこの点で日本よりは賢明なことを期待したいが、次期政権次第では分からない。日本の二の舞を起こす可能性もあるだろう。
ただ、FRBもインフレが怖いから、金利を下げすぎるわけにも行かない。そしてアメリカが金利を上げない限り日本の株価も上がらず、だらだらと下げ続けるだろう。
今後のアメリカの金利反転局面をどう予測するかがポイントになる。