Stockholders vs Stakeholders

Controlling Corporations: Stockholders vs Stakeholders

ちょっと久しぶりにDavid FriedamannのBlogを読んでみた。

<It follows that the stockholder is dependent, very much more than the other stakeholders, on other mechanisms for controlling a firm to make it act in his interest. That is a strong argument in favor of the current mechanism for corporate control and the current legal rules defining the fiduciary obligation of the directors.

Indeed, it is an argument for more than that. It is an argument for strengthening stockholder control in order to provide more protection to the most vulnerable party in the network of relationships that makes up a corporation. One way of doing so would be by removing current legal barriers that make takeover bids more difficult, and so protect managers and directors from the consequences of serving their own interests at the expense of the stockholders whose interests they are supposed to be serving.>
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David Friedman on Global Warming

David Friedman(=DF)がBLOGでGlobal Warmingの問題をこのところずっと取り上げている。

さらに、炭素税のようなピグー税方式の導入を唱えるアイデアにも否定的である。これは、Greg Mankiwのアイデアで、炭素税を導入しながら、これを他の税の減税と同時にやることでトータルで増税することなく排出量を制限できるという主張である。



”Furthermore, I think it unlikely that income from carbon taxes would be used to reduce other taxes. The clear evidence here is the repeated pattern with regard to wars. New taxes are introduced as an emergency measure for a war, retained long after the war is over; there is always some politically profitable way to spend the money. In the case of carbon taxes, I am confident that they would be used as an additional source of revenue, perhaps with the argument that the money was needed to ameliorate the effects of whatever global warming continued to occur.”


この問題は、当然ながらものすごく重要だ。温暖化に対応することが重要なのではなく、現在世界的にはびこっている地球温暖化に対するデマとヒステリックな立法措置といったtragedy comedyに対して、学問がいかに理性を用いて、その誤謬を訂正させることができるのかという試金石となるという意味で重要だ。
また地球温暖化に対する議論は、その経済学者の能力の試金石となることは間違いない。私の知る限りでは、WEB上にある議論としてはDavid Friedmannの議論がやはり傑出している。

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Third World and MPS

The Mont Pelerin Society, Milton Friedman, and the World

Monday, November 20, 2006 By David Friedman


I spent most of a week recently in Guatamala at a meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, an organization created by Friedrich Hayek after the Second World War. At the time it was created, supporters of free markets were rare, especially in the academic world. One reason to create the Society was to give people with classical liberal views the opportunity to spend at least a few days a year with other people who did not regard their beliefs as obvious nonsense, fit only for the wastebasket of history.

Some decades later, a number of people associated with the Society, including my father, suggested that perhaps it was time to dissolve it. Views that had been regarded as obviously obsolete in the late forties had become, if not always accepted, at least widely known and widely viewed as serious contenders in the marketplace of ideas. It was no longer necessary to go to some far corner of the world to find colleagues who shared a generally promarket viewpoint; with luck there were at least one or two down the corridor.

The argument that ultimately persuaded him and others that the Mont Pelerin Society ought to be continued was that, although libertarian views were now widespread and respected in the U.S., the situation was very different elsewhere. Especially in the Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and to a significant degree even in Europe, believers in free markets still found themselves in the situation that Hayek and others had faced when the Society was founded, isolated in a sea of left wing orthodoxy. For them, at least, the Society could continue to serve its original purpose.


Hayekが1947年に設立したモンペルランソサエティ(=MPS)にDavid Friedmanも加入したらしい。




MPSは具体的には、どのような活動をしているのかといえば、”One reason to create the Society was to give people with classical liberal views the opportunity to spend at least a few days a year with other people who did not regard their beliefs as obvious nonsense”





未だに日本ではsupporters of free markets were rare, especially in the academic worldの状態だ。


ジェフ サックスのような国連組織を動かした大規模な援助合戦は有害なだけだが、MPSのような第三世界の知的指導者たちに対する”教育”の方が遥かに効果のあるものだろうし、実際にMPSはそのような機能を歴史上、果たしてきた。

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David Friedmanが小説を発表したようだ。



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The Case of David Friedman

The Case of David Friedman

by Robert P. Murphy

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Law's order

Law and Economics for the Masses

by Eric A. Posner

エリックポズナー(リチャードの息子でシカゴ大学教授)によるデヴィッドフリードマンの”Law's Order"への書評


Law's Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why It Matters

David D. Friedman

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000


"Law's Order is the first popular treatment of law and economics. It is intended for students and academics unfamiliar with the economic analysis of law, but also for the "intelligent layman," and it is the latter person who seems to be David Friedman's imagined reader. In form and style, the book resembles the popular but sophisticated surveys of evolutionary biology, like Richard Dawkins's The Selfish Gene (Oxford University Press, 1990) – and, indeed, Friedman cites that book as a model. (5) Friedman's book largely succeeds at the task that he sets out for himself. It is a clearly written, readable, and interesting introduction to the main ideas underlying law and economics, alongwith a large collection of specific applications.・・続く"


A Reply to Eric Posner

by David D. Friedman


"Professor Eric Posner correctly observes that the printed version of Law's Order contains little in the way of references or mathematics. He is also correct in believing that notes on a website are less accessible than notes in a book. But while they are less accessible, they are a great deal more useful.

From the website, which contains page images of the entire book, one click on a marginal icon brings up the corresponding note. A second click brings up the full text of a referenced case (in the Findlaw, Lexis or West database), a webbed article, even a webbed book. The reader must be online to take full advantage of the virtual footnotes, but he does not, like readers of more conventional books, have to be in a library in order to make use of their references. For readers who do not expect to be online while reading the book, the website also contains the virtual footnotes as a single long file, in pdf and Word format, to be downloaded and printed.





一方でDavid Friedman Steven Landsburg Bryan Caplan というのはお仲間のようだ。

これらArmchair Economist達は、元々が理論物理学からの転向組みだ。

私もこの本=Law's order は持っているが、まだ読了はしてない。




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Price Theory: Ricardo: A hiker clad in T-shirt and tennis shoes at the top of the Everest

As economist David Friedman put it in his 1990 textbook, Price Theory,

"The modern economist reading Ricardo's Principles feels rather

as a member of one of the Mount Everest expeditions would feel if,

arriving at the top of the mountain, he encountered a hiker clad in Tshirt and tennis shoes."

Evolution TheoryのバックグラウンドにはRicardoもいそうである。

Evolution theoryとPrice Theoryは近い考え方である。
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David Friedman Laissez Faire Policy


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Efficiency, Justice and Liberty-By David Friedman


The attentive reader, and especially the attentive libertarian reader, will have noticed that I have said nothing about what the laws generated by the market will be, other than efficient. In particular, I have said nothing about whether those laws will be consistent with either justice or liberty. That omission was deliberate. My purpose here is to discuss what outcomes we can expect a competitive market for law to produce, not what outcomes we want it to produce. This is an essay in economics, not moral philosophy.

Whether these outcomes will be consistent with either justice or liberty depends on whether either justice or liberty is economically efficient. In the case of liberty, I think there is good reason to believe that, as a general rule, it is. A considerable part of libertarian writing, my own included,[21] as well as a good deal of economic theory from Adam Smith on, defends the thesis that, on the whole, leaving people free to run their own lives maximizes total human happinessfor which economic efficiency may be considered a rough proxy.[22]

Whether justice is efficient is a harder problem, and comes in two parts. The first is the question of whether the rules implied by justice are themselves efficient rules; to that I have no answer, since I have no theory of justice to offer other than that implied by individual liberty. The second is the relation between individuals\' beliefs about justice and their preferences for law.

Suppose that almost everyone in a society shares certain beliefs about justiceperhaps that the conviction of innocents is a very bad thing, to be avoided even at high cost, or that murderers should be executed, or that children should not be executed, even for murder. Those beliefs will affect but not determine what laws the people in that society demand. Justice is only one of the things people value; an individual might favor a legal rule he considers unjust if he thinks it benefits him. So we would expect the efficient set of legal rules generated by the market to represent some compromise between the legal rules that would be efficient absent specific beliefs about justice and the rules implied by those beliefs. To put it differently, beliefs about justice affect the value to individuals of being under particular legal rules, which affects what legal rules are efficient, which affects what legal rules the market will produce.




















であるからして、我々は市場によって生まれた法ルールの効率的なセットが、彼らの特定のJusticeに対する信条を欠いた法ル―ルと そのJusticeの信条を含んだルールとの間でのなにがしかの妥協点を表すと考えている。


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Anarchy, Efficiency and the Common Law -by David Friedman

I have argued that there is reason to expect  a system in which legal rules are generated by firms competing

in a private market  to produce efficient rules.

Richard Posner has argued that there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that the actual rules of angloamerican common law are efficient.

This raises an obvious and interesting question: can the mechanisms I have been describing explain the observed efficiency of the common law?

I do not know the answer to that question.

Certainly some forms of competitive law have contributed to the creation and development of the common law.

The common law had its origin in the legal system of AngloSaxon England,

whose early form involved a large element of private enforcement and private arbitration.[23]

It evolved in an environment of multiple court systemschurch, royal, and localwhere

litigants had at least some control over where their disputes were resolved.

Some common law rules originated as private norms,

and I have argued that norms are produced on something like a competitive market.

Some rules may have been borrowed from the medieval Fair Courts, which had some of the characteristics of the system I have described.

It is thus possible that what Posner observes in present day common law is fossilized efficiency, produced

by institutions that no longer exist[24] and preserved by the conservative nature of the common law.

That conjecture is consistent with the observation that the efficiency of the common law seems to have decreased

over time, at least in this century, with the long retreat from freedom of contract providing the most striking example.

It is also consistent with Posner\'s claim that it is common law, not legislated law, which tends to be efficient.

But it would require a much more extensive knowledge of the history and content of the common law

than I have to say whether such a conjecture provides a plausible account of such efficiency as modern common law possesses.[25]

In any case, the principal purpose of this chapter is not to offer a solution to the puzzle of why the common law is efficient,

supposing that it is. My purpose is to show why the law generated by the institutions of private property anarchy

would tend to be efficient, and to explore some of the limitations of that tendency.

Although the arguments I offer do not imply anything like a perfectly efficient legal system, they may provide better reasons

to expect efficient law under anarchy than we have to expect efficient law under other forms of legal system, including the sort we now have.

David Friedman


















また、 その傾向のいくつかの制限条件を探ることにある。

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Some Responses to Mike Huben\'s A Non-Libertarian FAQ

Critiques of libertarianism by Mike Hubens


これに対するDavid FriedmanのResponse

Some Responses to Mike Huben\'s A NonLibertarian FAQ

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For and Against the state


This is a chapter from For and Against the State, John Sanders and Jan Narveson eds.

\"For and Against state\"の各章から抜粋したもの。

More than twenty years ago, Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner suggested that many features of the common law could be explained by the conjecture that it was a set of legal rules that maximized economic efficiency.[0] To what degree the conjecture is correct is still a matter of debate, but, true or false, it has played a major role in the development of the economic analysis of law.

One weakness in Posner\'s argument was and is the absence of a plausible mechanism to generate efficient Common Law.[1] What he and his supporters offer instead is extensive analysis of the common law as it actually exists, designed to show that its rules are close to the rules that would have been chosen by an economist attempting to maximize economic efficiency. Lacking a compelling theory, they offer empirical evidencealthough a considerable addition of economic theory is required to argue that the rules observed to exist are the efficient ones.

My project in this chapter is the mirror image of Posner\'s. The legal system I will be describing does not exist, so I cannot observe its rules.[2] What I will be proposing is a theoretical analysis of why that legal system, if it existed, could be expected to generate efficient rules.[3]










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In Defense of Private Orderings

In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen¹s ³Copyright and the Jurisprudence of SelfHelp²

By David Friedman


It is becoming possible for owners of intellectual property in digital form to use technological protection instead of, or in addition to, copyright to control the use of their property. Professor Cohen argues against legal changes designed to facilitate this development; I argue in favor of them.

Her argument depends in part on conventional attacks on the legitimacy, hence the enforceability, of mass market contracts, in part on the claim that such technologies threaten individual privacy and autonomy, in part on the claim that copyright preempts alternative forms of protection‹and should, since it produces more desirable outcomes.

Economic theory suggests no reason why mass market contracts should be less enforceable than individually negotiated contracts‹and computer technology, in the form of ³clickwrap² contracts, makes it easier than in the past to create a legally adequate contract in a mass market context. With the exception of technologies that monitor software use and report it, and ought, therefore, to be accompanied by suitable warnings, technological protection of software poses no more threat to privacy or autonomy than traditional forms of producer control over the characteristics of their products. A private ordering of the market for intellectual property, based on contract and technological protection, can be expected to produce both more intellectual property and greater use of existing intellectual property than the current ³one size fits all² public ordering of copyright law. Current developments in this direction ought to be encouraged, not discouraged, by the law.

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David Friedman On The Austrian Test


D.FriedmanによるAustrian Testの感想
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David FriedmanのHP


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